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LYNTON K. CALDWELL*

Garrison Diversion: Constraints on
Conflict ResolutionFor two decades diversion of Missouri River water from the Garrison
Dam to east-central North Dakota has generated controversies at local,
state, national, and international levels. The major controversy has been
international involving the federal governments of Canada and the United
States, and the governments of the Province of Manitoba and the state
of North Dakota. Within the United States conflicts have arisen between
promoters of irrigation and protectors of waterfowl, and among farmers,
fishermen, bankers, environmentalists, and American Indians. Yet these
contentions need not have happened-or at least need not have been so
difficult to resolve. The Garrison Diversion controversies have concerned
ethics, values, and economic interests not susceptible to easy compromise.
Nevertheless, the conflicts might have been lessened through more carefully considered design for the project, utilizing data and methods now
customary in environmental impact analysis.
The Garrison Diversion project was unintentionally structured in a way
that induced the conflicts that have frustrated its completion. A major
constraint on the resolution of those conflicts was the absence of a mutually acceptable forum for conflict resolution. To the extent that resolution of the Garrison controversy has been approached, the primary factor
has been scientific information. If future international controversies, such
as Garrison, are to be avoided, an agreed-upon system or arrangement
for conflict resolution using agreed-upon criteria for validated evidence
will be necessary.
Possibly the fact-finding functions of the International Joint Commission (IC) of Canada and the United States might be extended and developed for further resolution of Garrison-like conflicts, and for other
transboundary disputes. The IJC has the advantage of being an institution
in place, supported by precedent, wide transboundary acceptance and the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. Other institutional arrangements are
possible, however, which would be preferable to avoid costly "trial by
*Department of Political Science and School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University.
tBased in part upon work supported by NSF-NEH EVIST grant #ISP 82-04988, Case Studies
on Science, Technology, and Values in Social Conflicts Concerning the Environment. Any opinions,
findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this article are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the view of the Foundations.
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combat" in large public works and development projects. The following
discussion considers the need for better institutional arrangements to clarify issues, forecast consequences, and identify alternative courses of action in transboundary environmental disputes.
THE GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT
The Garrison Diversion project was an outgrowth of the Pick-Sloan
compromise between the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation for the multi-purpose development of the Missouri River, adopted
by the Congress as part of the Omnibus Flood Control Act of 1944.'
From an initial proposal to irrigate more than one million acres in the
Dakotas, the modified authorization adopted in 1965 reduced the project
to irrigate only 250,000 acres in North Dakota. The state established the
Garrison Diversion Conservancy District to cooperate with the federal
Bureau of Reclamation in construction of the project.'
Unrecognized by the authors of the Pick-Sloan compromise, these plans
were encumbered by major unforeseen problems. A substantial part of
the return flows from the irrigated acres would discharge into rivers
entering the Canadian Province of Manitoba and emptying into Lake
Winnipeg in the Hudson Bay watershed. Thus Garrison Diversion, as
authorized, entailed a massive inter-basin transfer of water, which was
also an international transfer with environment-affecting consequences,
thus potentially falling under provisions of the Canadian-American Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909.' Failure of the sponsors of the project to appreciate
I. For a discussion of the Pick-Sloan plan, see HENRY C. HART, THE DARK MISSOURI
(1957); MARIAN E. RIDGEWAY, THE MISSOURI BASIN'S PICK-SLOAN PLAN: A CASE
STUDY IN CONGRESSIONAL POLICY DETERMINATION (1955). The Pick plan is printed in
H.R. DOC. NO. 475, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1944); the Sloan plan in S. DOC. NO. 191, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1944). For the joint plan, see Control and Use of the Water Resources of the
MissouriRiver Basin: Hearingson S. 1915 Before the Senate Comm. on Irrigationand Reclamation,
78th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1944); and Flood Control Act of Dec. 22, 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887
(1944).
2. For authorizing legislation, see Act of Aug. 5, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-108, 79 Stat. 433

(1966).

3. For various accounts of the Garrison Diversion Project, see David L. Keys, North Dakota's
Garrison Diversion Unit: A Case Study of Domestic and International Environmental Values Conflict
(Aug., 1984) (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana Univ.); The Garrison Diversion Unit: Irrigator'sPipe
Dream, Is Wildlife Nightmare:An Audubon Special Report, 2 AUDUBON ACTION, 6-10 (1984);
NANCY J. DOEMEL, THE GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS AND VALUES (1979); JOHN E. CARROLL & RODERICK M. LOGAN, THE GARRISON
DIVERSION UNIT: A CASE STUDY IN CANADIAN-U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONS
(1980); Carroll, PrairieWater Issues, in ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: AN EXAMINATION
AND A PROSPECTIVE OF CANADIAN-U.S. TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONS 313-22 (1983) [hereinafter cited as PrairieWater].
4. Treaty on Boundary Waters, Jan. 11, 1909, United States-United Kingdom, 36 Stat. 2448,
T.I.A.S. No. 548. See also Comment, The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909: Does It Provide an
Environmental Cause of Action?, 20 S.D.L. REV. 147 (1975).
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its ecological and international dimensions opened the way to a bitter
international controversy that remains unresolved.
This lack of foresight may be explained in part by the relative absence
of environmental awareness in both Canada and the United States at the
time of authorization. Advancement in fresh water ecology and in general
ecological sensitivity occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, bringing about
a new set of circumstances. The planners of Garrison could not foresee
the dawning of the "age of ecology." Moreover, as was common federal
agency practice before passage of the National Environmental Policy Act
and its environmental impact statement requirement, Bureau of Reclamation engineers were not obliged to tell the American public (and even
less the Canadian public) all that they knew about the side effects of
Garrison. Thus some of the opposition did not arise until people belatedly
discovered how the project would affect their lives and property. As details
of the diversion became more widely known, objections developed among
some North Dakota farmers and among environmental protection groups,
notably within the National Audubon Society. There were complaints
over inequities but the principal objections related to the adverse effect
of the project on migratory waterfowl. As awareness of the project gradually developed in Canada, opposition grew: first, to flooding along the
Souris, Assiniboine, and Red Rivers; second, to degraded water quality
from irrigation return water; and third, from unwanted biota transfers
from the Missouri River basin.' Intransigence of the project's sponsors
and latent suspicions among many Canadians regarding the intentions of
the United States government led to an escalation of anti-Garrison feeling
in Manitoba which, by extension, came to assume proportions of a national issue in Canada, while being politically regarded as a local affair
in the United States.
In August of 1983, through a legislative maneuver in a congressional
conference committee, the Garrison Diversion obtained an appropriation
of $22 million toward completing what may have been euphemistically
described in the state of North Dakota as Phase I of the project. 6 No part
of Phase I was to involve discharge of Missouri River water into the
Hudson Bay watershed-which drains northeastern North Dakota and
perhaps half of the project acreage as originally proposed. Construction
under this appropriation would not exceed 85,000 acres which was much
less than half of the 1965 authorization. The state and the Bureau have
5. See generally DOUGLAS H. BOYD, THE IMPACTS OF THE GARRISON DIVERSION
UNIT ON CANADA (1975) (of special relevance is the discussion of reports issued by the IJC
International Garrison Diversion Study Board and by The Manitoba Environmental Council).
6. Energy and Water DevelopmentAppropriationsfor 1984: HearingsBefore a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Appropriations,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2446-77 (1983); and Congress OK's $22.33
Million for Project, I1 DIVERSION DIG. 1 (1983).
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never publicly conceded that the entire 250,000 acres originally authorized
will not be irrigated. They have, however, declared that Canadian waters
will not be adversely affected because no Missouri basin water will be
discharged into Canada so long as reasonable doubts exist regarding the
effects of the discharge.
The Garrison Diversion project thus has an uncertain future. Is Phase
I to be the final stage of the Diversion? American ambiguity as perceived
by Canadians leaves room for doubt regarding the intentions and good
faith of the government of the United States. One Congress does not bind
another. Is the Bureau of Reclamation playing for time in the hope that
further research may show Canadian fears to be groundless? Will the full
250,000 acre project be funded by some future Congress regardless of
Canadian objections, or will the project ultimately be reauthorized at the
Phase I level and the international controversy at last laid to rest?
THE RAMIFYING TENDENCIES OF LARGE PUBLIC WORKS
Scientific knowledge and associated technologies have vastly enlarged
opportunities for enterprises that reshape natural environments to advance
economic interests and political reputations. The costs of such projects
are often inordinately large in relation to the number of persons actually
benefited. The real cost-benefit ratios of large earth-shaping public enterprises are rarely attractive to private capital investment. Thus, extraordinary legal authority and fiscal arrangements are required to "develop"
required resources of land and water and to distribute benefits with minimal regard to market forces. Consequently the proponents of massive
economic development projects characteristically seek funding from public treasuries. Public works that benefit relatively few people are therefore
often financed by levies on the taxable income of a much larger number
who will not benefit and may be harmed by the projects.
The effects of large modem public works are not easily contained. 7
Even when sited well within national boundaries, large environmentshaping enterprises, public or private, may have transboundary effects.
Any large public works project today with adverse transnational impacts
upon air, water, or migratory wildlife has potential for international political repercussions. A resulting conflict might be manageable, however,
assuming an ability to control and mitigate the side effects of advanced
technologies. But, in fact, the effects of large technological undertakings
are seldom contained because they entail costs which their authors regard
as external to their objectives and thus prefer to avoid. Historically, these
costs have not been calculated or included in enterprise budgets and have
7. See, e.g., HAROLD FEIVESON, FRANK SINDEN & ROBERT SOCOLOW, BOUNDARIES
OF ANALYSIS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE TOCKS ISLAND DAM CONTROVERSY (1976).
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been treated, in the language of economists, as externalities. Cost-benefit
calculations characteristically take account only of effects upon the jurisdictions and people directly affected by a project. Thus the fiscal calculus for Garrison was based on estimated effects in North Dakota, taking
no account of effects in Manitoba for which the Bureau of Reclamation
perceived no legal responsibility when the project was planned. The
United States Congress authorized the Garrison Diversion upon the estimated ratio of benefits to costs in the United States. The Congress did
not require the Bureau of Reclamation to provide comparable estimates
for another country-e.g., Canada.
Science has extended the scope of external effects by enlarging technological capabilities. Science has also contributed greatly to public
awareness of externalized costs in several ways: first, through enhanced
and refined ability to identify, measure, and monitor environmental changes
and, second, through the ability to communicate resulting information
through news media and networks of concerned persons and organizations
which increasingly transcend political jurisdictions. As a result, national
and international environmental protection movements have been reinforced and extended.
Governments and international corporate enterprises are now beginning
to consider these environmental protection movements when planning
projects of multinational significance. Although the doctrine of national
sovereignty and the limited means of international interposition in national
undertakings restrain the influence of international environmental efforts
upon national policies, the effects of environmental awareness may nevertheless be felt. Since the early 1970s an unprecedented number of international treaties, memoranda of intent, and other forms of agreement
have been consummated that juridically and, to some degree, morally
bind nations to act in accordance with agreed-upon principles of environmental conduct. 8 Of course private promoters and the public officials
with whom they develop symbiotic relationships seldom regard such
obligations as binding. Moreover, officials of local, state, and provincial
8. For a compilation of environmental treaties, see INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT: TREATIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (B. Ruster, B. Simma, & M. Bock
ed. 1982). See also SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
SELECTED AND ARRANGED BY THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAWAND
COMPARATIVE LAW (1975). For a continuing list of conventions and protocols, see Register of
International Conventions and Protocols in the Field of Environment, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/Inf. 5
(1977 & Supp. V 1981). Information for the initial register was based largely on INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: MULTILATERAL TREATIES (W. Burhenne ed. 1974). For the texts
of fourteen environmental treaties negotiated prior to 1976, see B. JOHNSON, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 95-226 (1976).
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jurisdictions and of national agencies seldom concern themselves with
events occurring beyond their political boundaries.
Politicians everywhere have demonstrated capability for rationalizing
localized short-term advantages into issues of national public interest.
Thus water development projects of dubious economic merit and highly
selective local benefit have been promoted in the Congress as building
up the nation's economy-justifying national investment in projects actually benefiting relatively few people. The proposition that a nation may
do as it pleases with its own natural resources reinforces the claim that
national interests justify national funding. Thus foreign objections to the
consequences of large scale national public works or major environmentshaping enterprises are often rejected as unwarranted interference in the
internal affairs of the nation or its political subdivisions.
ISSUES IN CONTROVERSY
The controversy over the Garrison Diversion illustrates what can happen when a large government project gains scope and momentum, acquires the status of myth or promise, and is then caught in a cross-current
of changing values. The change of values and the resulting opposition to
the project occurred in an arena larger than its locale, which complicated
the case of the Garrison Diversion. Environmental organizations, notably
the National Audubon Society, organized a national effort to block the
project. Congressmen from the eastern states and California voted against
appropriations for Garrison. To many North Dakotans this opposition was
unwarranted interference with concerns exclusively North Dakotan. Yet
the magnitude of the project, its funding, and its physical effects could
not be contained within the state of North Dakota or even within the
United States. The return flow from a large percentage of the irrigation
works would, under the project as authorized, be discharged into rivers
flowing northward across the international boundary into Canada. Moreover, the money for realizing the implied promise of the project also
came from congressional appropriations outside the locale and was directly subject to a shift in environmental values throughout the United
States, again largely external to North Dakota.
The Garrison Diversion controversy involves four interrelating issues,
each of which has its own peculiar complexities:
(1) the propriety of public action when major conflict exists among
the people affected;
(2) the equity of allocating economic, social, and ecological burdens
among the people affected;
(3) the adequacy of criteria to evaluate the technical, economic,
social, and ecological impacts of the Garrison project; and,
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(4) the obligations of the United States under the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 as related to the three foregoing issues. 9
These issues and their substance and intensity have emerged over time
and have changed with developing circumstances at different rates and
in different directions. As a consequence, it has become increasingly
difficult for the people concerned to agree upon the ethics and values that
should be accorded primacy in the controversies and the legal principles
that might mediate their differences. Even when there may be a common
acceptance of statistical facts, differing perspectives have prevented agreement upon how they should be interpreted. A chain of controversy follows
from differing value orientations. Diversities of viewpoint extend to the
representatives of the institutions concerned, including the officials of
local, state, provincial, and federal governments. The cumulative effect
of these differences in attitudes, assumptions, and values, combined with
client-patron commitments, locks adversaries into positions that severely
constrain resolution of their conflicts. Reconciliation of differences requires time for alternative solutions to problems to be addressed and for
the rationalization and acceptance of strategic retreats from earlier irreconcilable positions. Complex conflict resolution especially requires institutional arrangements sufficiently informed and authoritative to formulate
acceptable solutions. In theory, arrangements for mediation and arbitration
are available but, in fact, they have not been generally or politically
acceptable. "
Conjectures for possible resolution of the Garrison conflict as presented
by this article cannot go beyond provisional conclusions for several reasons. The controversy over the extent of the Garrison Diversion has not
yet been resolved, and many of the effects of the project will become
evident only in the future. The Garrison project's history to date serves
to illustrate the risks of undertaking large environment-altering technological enterprises without sufficient scientific analysis and evaluation of
possible hazards to successful completion. The history of Garrison demonstrates the need for an institutional means for effectively preventing a
9. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION: UNITED STATES AND CANADA, RULES OF
PROCEDURE AND TEXT OF TREATY (1965).
10. For a discussion of problems of conflict management, see Robins, Conflict Management and
Conflict Resolution Are Not Synonymous Terms, 21 CAL. MGMT. REV. 67 (1978). A notable
Canadian-U.S. environmental dispute was settled by arbitration, however. See Trail Smelter Case
(U.S. v. Can.), Arbitral Tribunal, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1911 (1938) (interim decision); Trail Smelter
Case (U.S. v. Can.), Arbitral Tribunal, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1938 (1941) (final decision); Kiss,
Trail Smelter Case, in SURVEY OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 43-46 (1976); Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration,
50 OR. L. REV. 259 (1971); Dinwoods, The Politics of InternationalPollution Control: The Trail
Smelter Case, 27 INT'L J. 219 (1972). See also Goldberg, The GarrisonDiversion Project: New
Solutions for TransboundaryDisputes, 11 MANITOBA L.J. 177 (1981).
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conflict situation from arising or for mitigating a conflict when one has
arisen.
Underlying the Garrison Diversion controversy is a question that perhaps none of the participants have asked: What considerations should
determine how far society should go when replacing nature's systems
with those managed by man? It may be that this question is seldom asked
because to most people the answer has seemed obvious. Nature should
be replaced by man-made systems so long as some human purpose is
thereby advanced. From this answer a corollary question arises, also
seldom asked: What advantages, if any, will people lose, in a particular
circumstance, by managing nature? Rational consideration of these questions suggests the wisdom of true or extended cost-benefit and environmental impact analyses preceding any effort to supersede nature. What,
in fact, has passed for cost-benefit analysis among too many economists
and systems experts is a development-biased and incomplete exercise."
The calculation of the true costs and benefits of a large environmentshaping project like Garrison Diversion is at best an exercise in conjecture
because too many unknowns and too many variables preclude certainty.
Yet approximations in policymaking are preferable to untested, inadequately informed speculation or to uncritical assumptions.
Recognizing the limitations of cost-benefit analysis in policymaking,
the method is nevertheless a logical element in rational planning, but
with two equally essential provisos. First, the recognition that designated
costs and benefits, as distinguished from unevaluated consequences, are
value judgments and, secondly, there should be, prior to authorization,
a comprehensive and unbiased investigation of the consequences that may
follow implementation of the proposal. These consequences should include those effects occurring outside the project area where impacts may
be felt and where opposition may arise, as well as those physical and
social effects to be experienced within the geographic area over which
the project promoters and sponsors have political control.
Cost-benefit analysis is not science. It is technique. Quantification of
postulated costs and benefits does not make the analysis scientific. At
best quantification may reveal relationships otherwise overlooked and
may force a sharper and possibly more comprehensive consideration of
values. Cost-benefit analysis characteristically occurs within a particular
cultural and political milieu. Its investigators tend to view their subject
matter from their own political perspectives which may be colored by
particular cultural premises. Foreseeable effects of environment-altering
11. For a discussion of cost-benefit analysis, see generally EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, BENEFITCOST ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS (1981); Prest & Turvey, Cost-BenefitAnalysis:
A Survey, 75 ECON. J. 683 (1965).
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undertakings should be accounted for before estimating the extent to
which the consequences of the project may be considered costs or benefits.
But possibilities of significant effects may be unknown, overlooked, evaded,
or misinterpreted, and thus the basis for categorizing these effects as costs
or benefits or as neutral or variable may be unreliable.
Without knowledge of the probabilities of certain effects inherent in a
proposal, people are unable to consider what values may be at stake.
People have been known to seek tangible short-term benefits which they
might have declined had they understood that more fundamental longterm benefits were thereby sacrificed or that benefits might presently be
diminished or denied by resulting opposition. If environmental impact
assessment policies and techniques had been present in the 1960s, it seems
likely that a very different Garrison Diversion project might have been
proposed or, perhaps, no project whatever.' 2
Science may be able to help people get what they want, but science,
per se, does not tell people what they ought to want. This statement serves
as a corrective to the erroneous belief that science can solve all problems,
but it tends to mislead because it does not credit the human mind with
the ability to reassess values and purposes upon the basis of knowledge
of cause-effect relationships. Science is not able to tell people what values
to pursue or what projects to attempt, but science may be able to reveal
what consequences may be expected to follow. An appropriate use of
cost-benefit and environmental impact analyses should survey the broad
human social environment and not merely that part of the environment
categorized as "nature."
The four interrelated issues previously identified may now be examined
with the foregoing considerations in mind. The considerable degree of
uncertainty regarding the ultimate outcome of the Garrison Diversion
project qualifies the significance attached to these issues. My analysis
neither attacks nor defends the project and, with one important exception,
should not be regarded as contributing to adversary proceedings. The
exception is a very basic question that is in no way unique to Garrison:
Is it wise for government to commit itself to large projects irreversibly
impacting upon man and nature without prior thorough investigation of
the consequences likely to follow? The question is not rhetorical, but the
answer is not wholly a self-evident "no." A project may be ecologically
and socially unwise by almost every relevant criterion but still be advantageous to its backers. A relativistic evaluation from the perspectives
of the adversaries may lead to inconclusive results whereas a normative
approach utilizing scientific information and considering general and long12. But see Pfeiffer, Benefit-Cost Analysis of North Dakota's Garrison Diversion Unit: A Case
Study of Conflicting Interest, 3 W.J. AGRIC. ECON. 225 (1978).
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range effects may lead to an unambiguous conclusion depending upon
the accepted "norm." A normative designation of a particular state of the
environment as "preferred" may be science-based without itself being a
scientific judgment.
THE PROPRIETY OF PUBLIC ACTION WHEN
CONFLICT EXISTS AMONG THE PEOPLE AFFECTED
A major circumstance characterizing the Garrison Diversion and a
number of other environmental controversies arising since the 1960s is
that they did not appear to be controversial, or not significantly so, when
the commitments to the projects were made.' 3 Opposition developed as
people who were hitherto uninformed, neutral, or even supportive, belatedly discovered that the projects entailed costs and consequences that
they had not foreseen and did not like. Thus conflict arose between people
who stood by the original commitment, and those previously unaware
who now wanted the project to be reconsidered.
In almost every conflict of the Garrison type, the injection of scientific
findings new to the issue has affected the balance of public opinion. 4 In
the Garrison Diversion case, North Dakota wildlife conservationists and
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service shifted from early support to
de facto opposition because of advances in fresh-water ecology and wildlife management, and a closer examination of environmental impacts.
Unforeseen fears in the Province of Manitoba also arose because of these
new developments. Thus the propriety of public action became questionable when it continued on assumptions that appeared to be invalidated
by the best available scientific evidence. A question also arose as to the
propriety of action by the United States that might violate treaty obligations in relation to Canada. Regardless of the validity of these allegations the political circumstances under which the Garrison project was
conceived and launched had changed.
The newly available scientific data and the prospect of an international
dispute did not change the minds of North Dakotans whose criteria for
propriety were: (1) the federal "promise" to compensate North Dakota
for lands flooded by the Garrison Dam; (2) the statutory authorization of
the project by Congress; and (3) the pervasive assumption of an obligation
of government to promote economic growth. To persons of the foregoing
persuasions the ecological and international objections were come-lately,
self-interested efforts to change the rules of the game in mid-course and
13. See generally PrairieWater, supra note 3.
14. See ROBERT V. BARTLETT, THE RESERVE MINING CONTROVERSY SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1980). A notable case in point was the
discovery midway in the Minnesota Reserve Mining controversy that the taconite fibers discharged
into Lake Superior had asbestiform character and might possess carcinogenic properties.
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were manifestly unfair. A dissenting but smaller group of North Dakotans
were opposed to Garrison not only for ecological reasons, but more often
because of misgivings concerning the way in which the project was
implemented, especially in land purchase procedures, the allocation of
water rights, and the equitable distribution of financial benefits.
THE EQUITY OF ALLOCATING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND
ECOLOGICAL BURDENS AMONG THE PEOPLE AFFECTED
Perhaps there is no public project in which all people can benefit
equally. But in the Garrison case two types of inequity arose which appear
to have been underevaluated by the backers of the project if they were
identified at all. The first resulted from the alleged deviousness and unfairness of the federal government in the acquisition of land for reservoirs
and rights of way. This inequity pertained not only to the Diversion project
but to the original Garrison impoundment itself and the taking of Missouri
River bottom land by the government of the United States to be permanently flooded.
Some farmers who were forced to sell land to the project saw themselves
as ill-used because they were precluded from obtaining any benefit from
the Diversion water. Compounding this resentment was the belief that
federal agents resorted to threats and deception to purchase land at the
lowest possible price. Timid, naive, or cooperative landowners in the
Turtle Lake area were reported to have sold their acres at prices substantially below those obtained by tougher-minded neighbors. Is it right,
they asked, for people to be so treated by their government? 5
A question of equity also arose because some farmers who were involuntarily included in the irrigation district could not or did not wish to
benefit from the Diversion water but were obligated to pay Conservancy
District assessments. Similarly, charges of injustice arose from farmers
outside the project boundaries, or even inside, who were threatened with
loss of acreage for wildlife mitigation purposes. A case for inequity might
also have been made on behalf of the Three Affiliated American Indian
Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, the Mandans, Arikaras and Hidatsa. Indian lands (about one-third of the total acreage) were taken for
the Garrison reservoir but the tribes were denied access to Garrison water. 6
Ironically the state of North Dakota and proponents of the Garrison Di15. See, e.g., Letter from Steven C. Lian to Editor, Minot Daily News (June 4, 1984). Many
negative opinions were expressed by North Dakota farmers interviewed by the author and Nancy J.
Doemel in early September 1978, notably in the Turtle Lake area. See also GarrisonDiversion:
Rumblings on the Ditch, N.D. UNION FARMER 1 (July 1972).
16. Shanks, The American Indian and Missouri River Water Developments, 10 WATER RES.
BULL. 573 (1974); Shanks, MissouriRiver DevelopmentPolicy and RuralCommunity Development,
13 WATER RES. BULL. 255 (1977); and MICHAEL L. LAWSON, DAMMED INDIANS: THE
PICK-SLOAN PLAN AND THE MISSOURI RIVER SIOUX, 1944-1980 (1982).
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version project included these Indian lands in calculating the total acreage
"lost" to the impoundment. The federal government, moreover, has been
held morally obligated to compensate the state, but not the Indians, with
equivalent acreage of irrigated land.
The North Dakota leadership in government and business saw Garrison
Diversion as essentially a North Dakota development that was no one
else's concern and that the federal government was honor-bound to support. The equity issues could not, however, be contained within the state's
political boundaries. Specific objections to features of the Garrison were
made in the neighboring downstream states of South Dakota and Minnesota.' 7 There were also spillovers into Canada. Degraded quality of
return flows from the project into the Souris and Red Rivers was seen as
imposing predictable burdens in excess of any speculative benefits from
low-flow augmentation.
By the mid-1970s, opinion was beginning to turn against taxation for
expensive water projects of dubious benefit to the nation as a whole.
President Carter's effort to deny further funding for Garrison reflected
not only this sentiment but the additional belief that the project was
ecologically unsound as alleged by environmental organizations. Objections arose from Americans and Canadians who regarded the waterfowl
breeding areas in the North Dakota pothole country as national and, by
treaty, international assets. Environmentalists argued that migratory waterfowl were an international wildlife heritage that ought not be adversely
affected merely for benefit of relatively few farmers and business enterprises of North Dakota. Thus issues of equity were compounded with the
economic and ecological effects of Garrison that transcended state and
national boundaries. This leads to the question of whether any general
retrospective evaluation can be made regarding the Garrison Diversion
project.
THE ADEQUACY OF CRITERIA TO EVALUATE THE
TECHNICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ECOLOGICAL IMPACT
OF THE GARRISON PROJECT
This third issue in the Garrison case concerns the relationship between
science and values. Although the criteria initially available for evaluating
the consequences of the proposed action in the Garrison Diversion were
inadequate, they were nonetheless substantially more adequate than the
17. At one point in the legislative history of Garrison, negative votes in Congress by Representative
James Oberstar of Minnesota and Thomas A. Daschle of South Dakota reflected concern among
their constituents primarily concerning degradation of water quality in the Red and James Rivers.
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bases for decision actually used. 8 The way in which science was used
and not used in the Garrison case suggests certain propositions regarding
a reciprocal relationship between science and values, and those conditions
under which science may more effectively inform and guide public policy.
From a public policy perspective science per se makes an inappropriate
master and an unreliable servant, but a useful teacher. There is little
likelihood of Americans adopting public policies solely upon the basis
of the existing state of science. The common attitude has been to regard
science as a servant-as a handmaid to technology. Public policies are
usually adopted with little or superficial recourse to scientific information,
and thereafter science is invoked selectively to reinforce a prior decision.
Used this way, scientific methods are unreliable servants of truth.
It is almost axiomatic that when governments launch massive public
works a high degree of supportive rationalization will be invoked. Project
sponsors will not diligently pursue inquiries that might cast doubt upon
the wisdom of the project. And if unforeseen evidence subsequently arises
government officials almost invariably defend the authorized project on
grounds of legal obligation, if no other, and attempt to refute or put down
opposition. Although facts alone are insufficient to reverse the course of
public policy, organized and activated public opinion may do so if the
support of key decisionmakers can be won or the course of the project
obstructed. In recent years litigation under one or more federal environmental statutes has been the commonly elected way to block public works
projects.
Most of the active public that questioned and opposed the Garrison
project resided outside the state of North Dakota. Removed from the
social and political constraints within North Dakota, the opposition was
more impressed by scientific evidence than by legal rights or solemn
promises. Environmental impact analyses by the Institute of Ecology and
the University of Manitoba could raise questions regarding the consequences of the Garrison project without being charged with disloyalty to
the state of North Dakota. " The Institute and the Canadian University
could not, however, avoid the charge of "outside interference." It is
difficult to say how much positive or negative influence their findings
had on opinion in North Dakota.
There is some reason to believe, although it would be difficult to
demonstrate, that there has been much more opposition or indifference
to the Garrison project in North Dakota than has been apparent. Support
for Garrison, as originally authorized, has been a bi-partisan test of po18. THE INSTITUTE OF ECOLOGY, A SCIENTIFIC AND POLICY REVIEW OF THE FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT FOR THE INITIAL STAGE, GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT,
NORTH DAKOTA (1975).
19. Id.; BOYD, supra note 5.
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litical orthodoxy. It is plausible that fulfillment of the federal promise
and the project as authorized means much more to older politicians,
newspaper editors, bankers, and businessmen than to other North Dakotans. Yet with the North Dakota political system locked into support of
Garrison, only mavericks can be expected to dissent from the orthodox
viewpoint. The narrow perspective of official orthodoxy in North Dakota
prevented public consideration of alternatives to the authorized Garrison
project other than, and (for the most orthodox) even including, the six
alternative versions of the project drafted by the U.S. Department of the
Interior."°
In the Garrison controversy scientists produced evidence that supported
conjectures regarding questions such as the risks and consequences of
interbasin biota transfer that were inconsistent with official opinion in the
United States.2 ' It was this use of scientific knowledge and method to
assess the probable impact of official action that was sought through the
National Environmental Policy Act in the United States (1970) and subsequently through the Federal Environmental Assessment and Review
Process (1974) in Canada. 2 But for this analytic use of science the
Garrison project might have moved forward to completion as first planned.
Economics may be the ultimate modifier of Garrison, but science provided
the delay that has given economic rationality an opportunity to prevail.
The findings of technical studies sponsored by the International Joint
Commission had a quality of disinterestedness and objectivity that gave
them sufficient weight to influence the United States to delay implementation of the project. Although the official Garrison Diversion Unit project
still includes discharge of Missouri River waters into Canada, that part
of the plan affecting Canada may be permanently suspended. The indefinite suspension provides time to seek alternative solutions to the impasse.
In this respect evaluative criteria provided by the IJC and other studies
clearly had an influence upon policy decisions.
Only in retrospect will it be possible to determine the adequacy of the
criteria used to evaluate the multiple impacts of the Garrison Diversion
Project. That the project as authorized will never be completed seems
highly probable in view of an amendment to the Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill for fiscal year 1985 (No. 3291), introduced
20. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL
COMPREHENSIVE SUPPLEMENTARY ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1979);
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, SPECIAL REPORT
ON REEVALUATION AND MODIFICATION OF THE GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT (1979).
21. See, e.g., BOYD, supra note 5, INSTITUTE OF ECOLOGY, supra note 18; INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, TRANSBOUNDARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE GARRISON
DIVERSION UNIT (1977).
22. LYNTON K. CALDWELL, SCIENCE AND THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: REDIRECTING POLICY THROUGH PROCEDURAL REFORM (1982).
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on June 21, 1984 by North Dakota Senators Andrews and Burdick. The
amendment "To establish a commission to develop modifications to the
Garrison Diversion Unit of the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin program as
presently authorized" may mark the beginning of the final chapter of this
long and complicated controversy. Whether the criteria for project evaluation used by project opponents to stall earlier completion were scientifically defensible may be regarded as politically moot. The only definitive
test of their validity would have been for the project to have proceded
as authorized and its consequences thereafter ascertained. The adequacy
of the criteria and the scientific conjectures would then be known, but if
the consequences proved to be adverse, as predicted, science would be
vindicated but environmental values would have been lost.
In actuality, whatever the scientific validity of findings by the IJC
investigators and the scientists of the U.S. federal agencies, the criteria
employed proved adequate to the political objectives that involved the
use of science. The project was stalled. The bi-national IJC science teams
raised doubts about the environmental effects of the discharge of Garrison
water into Canada which the Bureau of Reclamation experts were unable
to dispel. The criteria employed in the IJC reference developed findings
that helped to solidify Canadian opposition to Garrison and reinforced
the arguments of opponents in the United States. The practical test of
adequacy was political, not scientific.
THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER
THE BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY
Under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between the United Kingdom for Canada and the United States:
It is further agreed that the waters herein defined as boundary waters
and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on
either side to the injury of the health or property of the other.'
The United States government has never denied its obligation to honor
this agreement but there have been ambiguities and differences between
the parties to the treaty over the interpretation of the phrase "polluted on
either side to the injury of the health or property of the other." What
constitutes pollution and who determines when health or property have
been injured and by what criteria? The prohibitory factor in the provision
is "injury," not the mere presence of pollution if found to be non-injurious. Inherent in the terms of the treaty are potential conflicts over the
23. For text of the treaty, and a chronology of antecedent events, see PrairieWater, supra note
3, at 313-22.
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criteria for determining "injury" to health or property. Is any degree of
pollution to some extent injurious and how is the fact of injury established?
The parties to the treaty have a common agent in the UC which, acting
through investigators, may make findings and even recommendations
regarding boundary waters controversies. 4 The IJC is, however, unable
to make a politically authoritative determination of action to be taken by
the respective governments. Nevertheless, in 1975 the federal governments of Canada and the United States agreed to refer certain problems
concerning the probable effects of the Garrison Diversion upon Canadian
waters to the International Joint Commission.
The IJC established the International Garrison Diversion Study Board
(IGDSB) which established a number of technical committees to study
the following six uncertainties: (1) the present state of water quality in
the Souris and Red Rivers, their tributaries and other downstream waters;
(2) the present uses and reasonably anticipated future uses of the affected
waters; (3) the effects of present water quality upon uses of water; (4)
the nature, extent, and location of impacts on the quantity and quality of
these rivers because of the completion and operation of the Garrison
project; (5) the nature, extent, and economic costs of such impacts; and
(6) the nature and extent of the impact on commercial and recreational
fisheries in Manitoba resulting from the possible introduction of fish, fish
diseases, and fish parasites from the Missouri River system through the
Garrison project.
After extensive public hearings and wide distribution of the technical
reports of the IGDSB, the IJC on August 12, 1977 issued its recommendations. The Commission, summarizing its view of the obligations of the
United States under the Treaty of 1909, recommended that:
...
[t]hose portions of the Garrison Diversion Unit which could
affect waters flowing into Canada not be built at this time ....
That, if and when the Governments of Canada and the United
States agree that methods have been proven that will eliminate the
risks of biota transfer, or if the question of biota transfer is agreed
to be no longer a matter of concern, then the construction of that
portion of the Garrison Diversion Unit which would affect waters
flowing into Canada may be undertaken (subject to certain conditions).
24. See Note, A Primeron the Boundary Water Treaty and the InternationalJoint Commission,
51 N.D.L. REV. 493 (1974); Callum, The InternationalJoint Commission, 72 CAN. GEOGRAPHICAL J. 76 (1966); Dwivedi, The InternationalJoint Commission:Its Role in UnitedStates-Canada
Boundary Pollution Control, 40 INT'L REV. AD. SCI. 369 (1974); Welsh, The Work ofInternational
Joint Commission, DEP'T ST, BULL. 311 (Sept. 1968); Wex, The Legal Status of the International
Joint Commission Under Internationaland MunicipalLaw, 16 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 276 (1978).
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[T]hat the two Governments negotiate appropriate water quality
agreements for the Souris and Red Rivers.'
The involvement of the IJC, as a bi-national neutral party with a
reputation for objectivity, was the critical event in bringing the controversy
to a point of tentative agreement although not to ultimate resolution. The
IJC clarified the obligation of the United States in relation to biota transfer.
The IJC, however, did not and could not go farther in view of the uncertain
prospect of biota transfer or of the uncertain effects of the transfer. Nor
could the IJC anticipate the conditions that would reassure the Canadian
government that no serious ecological or economic risks would follow
from the inter-basin transfer. In effect, the position taken by the IC was
that the United States risked violation of the Boundary Waters Treaty and
of international law should it proceed with the 1965 authorization of the
Garrison Diversion project and the effects of the return flow into Canada
be found to be adverse. The ramifications of the Garrison Diversion had
extended beyond the foresight of its sponsors, and consequently the full
project as authorized appeared to be indefinitely blocked.
The suspension of the Garrison project dismayed project backers in
North Dakota. The sponsors of the project felt that a solemn promise of
the federal government to the state was being subverted by external forces
indifferent to the state's future. They could disparage Manitoban fears
regarding degraded water and biota transfer but could not exorcise the
belief that these risks might be real. The Province of Manitoba conversely
was not in an entirely irreproachable position to complain about water
quality; Canadian farms and cities in Manitoba were polluting the Red
River and, unavoidably, Lake Winnipeg.
As of August 1984, and the appointment by Secretary of the Interior
Clark of a twelve member "blue ribbon" commission to develop modifications to the project as authorized, it appeared unlikely that the legitimacy of the original authorization in relation to the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 would be brought to test. The mere fact of pollution of
25. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, TRANSBOUNDARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT 121-22 (1977). For example, the Congress, however, is less
inclined to be bound by GAO opinions; in 1957 the General Accounting Office recommended against
authorization of the revised Garrison Diversion Unit Plan. See Garrison Diversion Unit, Missouri
River Basin Project:Hearingon H.R. 7068 Before the House Comm. on Interior andInsularAffairs,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). See also U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, CONGRESS NEEDS
MORE INFORMATION ON PLANS FOR CONSTRUCTING THE GARRISON DIVERSION
UNIT IN NORTH DAKOTA, REPORT TO THE CONSERVATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES
SUBCOMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (NOV. 25, 1974); U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION'S PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES FOR COMPUTING AUTHORIZED COST CEILINGS
AND PROJECT COST ESTIMATES NEED IMPROVEMENTS (1975). See also GarrisonDiversion
Unit, Missouri River Basin: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
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Canadian waters by discharge from the Garrison project would have been
insufficient to establish a violation of treaty obligations by the United
States. As previously noted, Article IV of the Treaty declares "that the
waters-flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side
to the injury of health or property on the other." The Treaty does not
define "injury" thus leaving its determination to the judgment of the
respective sovereign parties. The IJC findings identified threats of injury
but actual physical injury could not have been established prior to actual
occurrence. Whether threat to the fisheries on Lake Winnipeg or to food
processing enterprise in Portage la Prairie could be found to constitute
injury to health or property is uncertain. In any event the legal obligations
of the United States under the Boundary Waters Treaty were not put to
test by Garrison.26
THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS
The foregoing considerations suggest two propositions regarding the
relationship between ethics and values and science and technology and
the political consequences of the relationships. First, if persons knew the
probable consequences of their actions, it is conceivable that some might
reconsider their objectives. There are, of course, those whose commitment
to an ethic or value is so unquestionable that any evidence which might
raise doubt regarding the validity of the value would be resisted. But
ethics, values, and the uses of technology in principle are susceptible to
clarification by honest uses of science. In other words, the sciences and
the humanities need not be opposing cultures. Until recently, no modem
society has seriously attempted to use science instructively prior to the
decision which science is asked to serve. A partial exception is the use
of science in environmental impact analysis and in technology assessment.
Currently science is invoked to ascertain the probable consequences of
environment-shaping programs and projects, as well as to test food and
drug products prior to public sale or distribution. Yet such forecasting
efforts are conspicuously rare in large public works enterprises. Could
the timely and unbiased application of scientific knowledge and methodology diminish the likelihood of costly and frustrating controversies
such as the Garrison Diversion case?
A second relationship between politics, technology, and values emerges
from the timing of events. Had the IJC studies on Garrison been made
prior to congressional authorization, the project design might have been
different. No formal arrangement encompassing ethics, values, science,
26. For an analysis of the legal issues relating to Boundary Waters Treaty, see Gaines, The
InternationalLaw Aspects of the Garrison Diversion Project, 4 ENVTL. L. REP. 50085 (1974).
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technology, and politics can guarantee against errors in judgment and
none is immune to manipulation or to various degrees of disregard. Nevertheless, arrangements can influence outcomes, and there is more to be
gained and less to be lost if this value-based scientific influence on making
policy comes early rather than late. Authoritative knowledge joined to
official authority is difficult to disregard. Study of the Garrison case and
others of similar origin suggests the wisdom of an objective scientific
pre-audit of earth-shaping projects of the magnitude and impact of the
Garrison Diversion. There are persuasive reasons for extending this science pre-audit to projects of comparable environmental significance in
the private as well as the public sector.
The idea of a pre-audit is not without precedent. It is consistent with
the functions of the multi-disciplinary panels convened by the government
in Canada to determine the need for an environmental assessment of a
proposed project. A scientific review resembles the interagency-interdisciplinary "scoping" exercises undertaken in the United States pursuant
to the National Environmental Policy Act. It would have been a function
of earlier proposals for federally-sponsored environmental science institutes, one of which received presidential endorsement during the Nixon
administration but foundered in disputations among White House staff.27
The independence of a science pre-audit from effective political or bureaucratic pressure would be essential to its credibility. No institution
with such a mission could be free from attempts to influence its output.
But, so far as feasible, provisions should be made to protect it from
readily identifiable sources of bias and pressure. A science pre-audit,
moreover, should have an open and public character that, for example,
the foundation-funded policy research institutions clustered in and around
the District of Columbia currently do not possess.
The need for an international institutional arrangement for bi-national
issues is a logical inference from the history of Garrison Diversion. The
bi-national character of the IJC Garrison studies gave them an acceptability that probably would not have been accorded to investigations by
wholly American or Canadian research institutions. The sponsorship,
status, and cost of an international institution would raise practical problems. Its principal hazard would probably be bureaucratic territoriality.
Nonetheless, the only power that national decisionmakers could lose
through such an arrangement would be the power to make uninformed,
premature, or politically biased judgments with impunity. Judgments, if
27. See JOHN C. WHITAKER, STRIKING A BALANCE: ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCE POLICY IN THE NIXON-FORD YEARS 333-34 (1976); Special Message to the
CongressProposingthe 1971 EnvironmentalProgram, Feb. 8, 1971, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, NIXON, 1971, 125 (1972).
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made in the face of strong negative evidence, would be less likely to
prevail. Citizens might regard this curb on official decisionmaking as
desirable and consistent with the objective of responsible decisionmaking
in government. International bodies, however, are not directly politically
accountable to popular constituencies. Removal from national domestic
politics is paradoxically a source of strength and weakness and is reconciled only if the quality and objectivity of the scientific inquiry overcomes a lack of conventional political influences. As to the cost of preaudit research, a substantial savings should be anticipated because futile
post-facto research would be less necessary. Moreover, a vast institutional
network already exists with the capability to contribute to analysis of the
broadest conceivable range of scientific problems. The organized and
interrelating structure of universities and research institutes fulfills this
purpose. A great variety of cooperative research arrangements has already
been successfully instituted and this experience could be applied to new
arrangements. The science pre-audit is not the kind of activity for which
national academies of sciences would seem appropriate except in particular and exceptional instances.
The propositions that emerge from a review of the Garrison Diversion
case are not new or utopian. International scientific review is, in fact,
required if repetitions of the Garrison experience are to be avoided. Preauthorization inquiry and audit would replace, rather than duplicate, those
kinds of research that have been done too late to influence policy. The
science pre-audit would not duplicate but might substitute for or supplement the environmental impact analysis which federal agencies in the
United States are required to make under Section 102 (2) (c) of the
National Environmental Policy Act.
Given the constraints of energy, materials, economic considerations,
and claims on space, our society in the future may not be as profligate
as it has been in the past when launching vast enterprises with minimal
regard to possible consequences. Certainly a more careful and broaderbased pre-authorization review will be required for great projects in the
future to avoid major national mistakes and corresponding international
controversies. At this stage in political development, however, it seems
safe to predict that many controversies will not be avoided. Nevertheless,
there are some positive indications that social learning is occurring and
political systems are responding to advancing understanding of the environmental implications of development projects. In the twelve years
since the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment international environmental policy has developed at an unprecedented r t/e.
An interrelating structure of treaties, programs, and institutional arrangements has been put together both within and outside of the United Nations
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system.28 In North America, the bilateral International Joint Commission,
established pursuant to the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, has gradually
acquired enlarged responsibility and authority. The IJC's fact-finding
functions were invoked in the Garrison Diversion controversy to a greater
extent than they had been in other environmental issues arising between
Canada and the United States.
In the early 1970s a number of proposals were advanced to establish
research and fact-finding institutions for environmental policymaking.
None, with the partial exception of the nongovernmental Institute of
Ecology (TIE), materialized and it ceased operation in 1984.29 The arguments for these proposals and the reasons for their failure deserve
investigation. There is no "proof" that the TIE review of the Garrison
Diversion Environmental Impact Statement and the reports of the International Garrison Diversion Study Board were decisive factors in suspending construction of the Garrison project although the circumstantial
evidence is very persuasive. The fiscal rationality of the project was a
more important consideration to many of Garrison's opponents in the
Congress.
The investigations of the effects and implications of Garrison were after
the fact of congressional authorization of and after extensive design work
and land acquisition for the Garrison project had been undertaken. No
institution presently exists with the capability of providing an adequate
and objective analysis of large-scale project proposals having significant
international environmental implications in advance of official authorization. In the early 1970s, a proposal to establish an international research
center for the environment was considered by ICSU's Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE), and a bill to establish
a world environment institute was proposed in the Senate of the United
States.3" The prevailing opinion was, however, that the tasks of research
on global environmental problems would exceed the capabilities of any
single agency.
Real as the hazards confronting international research may be, there
nevertheless remain needs for scientific inquiry unmet by any existing
28. See generally LYNTON K. CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: EMERGENCE AND DIMENSIONS (1984); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION (D. Kay & H. Jacobson ed. 1983); JAN SCHNEIDER, WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ECOLOGICAL
LAW AND ORGANIZATION (1979); ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: CONCEPTS AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS (A. Utton & D. Henning ed. 1973); INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (L. Teclaff & A. Utton ed. 1974).
29. See CALDWELL, supra note 22, at 116-17.
30. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 92nd CONG. 2D SESS., THE NEED
FOR A WORLD ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE (Comm. Print 1972). On the proposal for an
International Environmental Center (ICE), see id. pp. 19-20.
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institutions. Perhaps the world needs an international research institution
of broad competence to which cases may be referred that exceed the
capabilities of other institutions and that have proved to be irreconcilable
by the adversarial processes. The development of such an institution,
which would certainly require time, could make a significant contribution
to international conflict resolution. Equally important, it might prevent
or mitigate some of the more environmentally damaging enterprises to
which modem governments and multinational corporations are too often
susceptible.
The most plausible prospect for such an international research capability
would be a bi-national arrangement between Canada and the United States.
The IJC investigations have already provided precedent. The need for binational cooperation and decisionmaking on a large number of transboundary issues, especially affecting the Great Lakes, is growing. Feasibility of some form of bi-national monitoring and assessment of
transboundary environmental effects was the focus of a bi-national workshop sponsored by the IJC and held in Philadelphia, October 9-11, 1984.
Whether the legacy of mistrust that has resulted from previous environmental and natural resources controversies can be allayed sufficiently to
build a bi-national cooperative monitoring and forecasting system acceptable to both Canada and the United States remains to be seen.
By mid-summer 1984"' the constraints on resolution of the Garrison
Diversion conflict had led to frustration for all parties concerned. Canadians were apprehensive over the 1983 appropriation of $22.3 million
for work on Garrison "Phase I," providing for construction that could
be justified only on an assumption that the project would be completed
as authorized including discharge of "return flows" into Canada. Project
proponents had been thwarted by litigation initiated by the National Aududon Society and by growing disaffection for the project in the House
of Representatives. The IJC recommendations and Canadian diplomatic
pressure in Washington made completion as authorized highly doubtful,
with the invocation of the Boundary Waters Treaty as an ultimate possibility. The uncertain future of the Garrison Project hurt morale in the
Bureau of Reclamation and did not help its image in the Congress or in
the nation's news media. Opponents of Garrison were dissatisfied; they
had stalled the project but could not kill it. The tendency of incremental
funding to slip through the appropriations process nourished the fear that
Garrison might one day be completed through a piece by piece project
creep.
By 1984, all adversaries appeared to be weary of the conflict and ready
at last for some reasonable form of compromise. The National Audubon
31. See Death of a Dinosaur,N.Y. Times, July 11, 1984 at 22 (nat'l ed.).
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Society employed the Wright-Water Engineering firm to explore the possibility of environmentally acceptable alternatives. On June 1, 1984 the
President and the Chairman of the Board of the National Audubon Society
in a letter to the congressional representatives and the Governor of North
Dakota proposed a compromise entailing withdrawal of Audubon's opposition and a redesigning of the Project to meet North Dakota's water
needs without incurring the environmental and international objections
to the original authorization. Following negotiations involving the North
Dakota authorities and the Audubon Society, Senators Andrews and Burdick, on June 21, 1984, introduced an amendment (3291) to the FY 85
Energy and Water Appropriations Bill that looked to a final resolution of
the conflict. The Secretary of the Interior was authorized to appoint a 12
member commission "to review the contemporary water needs of the
State of North Dakota and propose modifications to the Garrison Diversion
Unit consistent with the existing authorization." 3 2
The commission, as appointed by Secretary William Clark and chaired
by former governor of Louisiana David C. Treen, was broadly representative of interests and concerns in the project and, in addition to the
chairman, included members from outside the State of North Dakota.
Secretary Clark described the commission as "the entity, the institution,
if you will, to resolve the remaining issues." 33 Prospects for a final
resolution of differences over the project appeared bright, and yet there
were costs incurred during its earlier years that could not be redeemed.
Losses to displaced farmers, Indians, and wildlife could not be offset by
subsequent benefits to other groups. Controversy over Garrison had been
long and costly and in retrospect a better way to have managed the conflict
would have been in everyone's interest. In the end, an institutional arrangement with non-partisan participation became necessary to overcome
the constraints to conflict resolution. Had such an arrangement existed
at the time of project authorization, the history of the Garrison Diversion
Unit might have been very different.
The Canadian Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process
(EARP) established in 1974 and strengthened in 1984 provides an initial
environmental screening and assessment of projects that, if applied in
principle to Garrison at the outset and before final authorization, could
have identified many of the obstacles that subsequently arose to block
project completion. Such a review in the Garrison case would logically
have been bi-national. The IJC reference was the nearest approach to
such an arrangement, but was belated and unable to provide a positive
32. See CONG. REC. S7922-29 (daily ed. June 21, 1984). See also 49 Fed. Reg. 32,687 (1984)
and Holden, Day of Reckoning for the GarrisonProject, 225 SCIENCE 904-06 (Aug. 1984).
33. 12 DIVERSION DIGEST 1, 6 (1984).

October 1984]

GARRISON DIVERSION

863

resolution of the issues in dispute. The inference to be drawn from the
Garrison case is that the IJC, or some comparable bi-national body yet
to be created, should be authorized to make preliminary assessments of
proposals with transboundary implications prior to actual authorization
and funding. It seems plausible to believe that bi-national environmental
issues crossing the Canadian-American border will continue to arise, and
that it would be sensible to make provision for institutional arrangements
to cope with them in preference to the costly trial-by-combat that characterized the long history of the Garrison Diversion Unit.

